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1 1 Introduction 
Culture is a central concept broadly studied in social anthropology and sociology. It 
has been gaining increasing attention in economics in relation to research on 
discrimination in a labor market (Becker 1957), identity (Akerlof 2005, Eckel and 
Grossman 2005), gender (Croson and Gneezy 2009),  and social preferences 
(Andreoni  et al. 2003, Charness and Rabin 2002, Falk and Fischbacher 2006). Most 
of experimental economics research on culture studies inter-national or inter-ethnic 
differences in economic behavior (Roth et al. 1991, Buchan and Croson 1999, 
Fershtman and Gneezy 2001, Henrich et al. 2001, Chuah et al. 2009). In contrast, this 
paper focuses on universal dimensions of culture, dimensions that can be applied to 
all ethnicities. We define culture as a set of shared values, attitudes, goals, and 
practices that characterizes an institution, group or society.  Even though cross-
national and cross-ethnic differences exist, most human societies recognize and 
enforce (to different extents) universal norms such as consideration for others, mutual 
reciprocity, and greater reward for greater effort. Such norms alter economic activities 
in a way that causes individuals to not only pursue self-interest but also exhibit other-
regarding preferences in decision-making.  
We conceptualize culture based upon the ``grid-group” framework for 
representing universal dimensions of cultural values developed in social and cultural 
anthropology (Douglas 1970). In grid-group theory, culture is classified along two 
abstract dimensions. The first is group, which represents the extent to which a culture 
emphasizes the degree of solidarity and shared identity among members of a 
particular group, community or society, as opposed to emphasizing the separateness 
of individuals. The second is grid, which represents the extent to which a culture 
embodies and enforces standardized and shared social norms and rules for achieving 
collective goals, as opposed to personal, self-oriented approaches to problem-solving. 
This grid-group framework is chosen because of its parsimony, and the fact that it is 
probably the best-known formalized classification of cultures in the contemporary 
social science literature (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Chai and Wildavsky 1994). Its 
two abstract dimensions have been shown to be accurate predictors of numerous 
concrete cultural predispositions (Chai et al. 2009). Finally, the grid-group framework 
focuses on two operationalizations of its dimensions, altruism (group) and reciprocity 
(grid), which have been closely investigated by economists using different approaches 
2 (Andreoni 1995; Charness and Rabin 2002; Croson 2007).  Group is closely related to 
altruism in abstract games, since shared identity implies that an individual’s utility 
function will include the interests of all members of a community.   Grid is closely 
related to reciprocity since of all social norms, this is the one that is most universally 
recognized as having some degree of importance across all cultures. 
The objective of this paper is to study how non-pecuniary motivations or 
culture may affect economic choices. We measure the altruism (group) and 
reciprocity (grid) cultural values using an attitudinal survey drawn from items in the 
World Values Survey (WVS). The design of the survey is described in Chai et al. 
(2009). In the experiment, 220 students participated in the survey, followed by the 
dictator, ultimatum and trust games. We study whether altruism and reciprocity 
scores, derived on the basis of the survey, are good predictors of economic behavior 
in our laboratory experiments. In accordance with this operationalization of the grid-
group cultural theory, we hypothesize that individuals with low group and low grid 
characteristics will act in a more self-interested manner and would not penalize others 
at their own cost. Individuals with high group scores will act more generously toward 
others, and those with high grid scores will incur costs for punishing others to enforce 
norms.  
  Our experimental results indicate that culture, as measured using this 
attitudinal survey, is a strong predictor of people’s economic behavior. We find that 
individuals with higher group scores offer more and accept lower offers in the 
ultimatum game, and return more in the binary trust game. In contrast, individuals 
with higher grid scores have higher minimum acceptable amounts in the ultimatum 
game, thus willing to punish others. Moreover, subjects with higher grid scores divide 
fewer dollars in the convex version of ultimatum game and return fewer dollars in the 
convex trust game.  
We classify people based on the juxtaposition of the two cultural attributes and 
find almost equal proportion of the three cultural types: altruists with high group 
scores and low grid scores, self-interested types with low scores in both dimensions, 
and reciprocators with high grid scores but high or low group scores. The behavior 
exhibited by these classes of individuals is consistent across various games and 
validates our survey instrument. 
Several previous studies that incorporate a survey instrument link trusting 
attitudes with trusting and contributing behavior in experiments. Glaezer et al. (2000) 
3 and Fehr et al. (2002) find that survey measures better reflect trustworthy behavior 
than trusting behavior, and direct questions about past behavior are good predictors of 
trusting action in the lab. Gachter et al. (2004) find that out of several measures of 
trust attitudes, the General Social Survey (GSS) trust question poorly reflects trust 
attitudes in relation with cooperative behavior. However, the trust strangers and the 
GSS fair and GSS help questions were accurate in predicting trust and contributing 
behavior. Anderson et al. (2004) find significant correlation between the trust 
question and contributions in the public good experiment. Chuah et al. (2009) relate 
WVS question responses across UK and Malaysian subjects in the ultimatum game 
and suggest that the higher offers of Malaysian subjects may reflect their attitudes 
towards individual freedom and civic-mindedness. Higher offers in both subject 
groups were due to whether a person has materialist and work-leisure values and be 
non-religious. The studies above consider the relationship between one particular 
attitude (e.g. trust or civic-mindedness) and experimental behavior. None of the 
studies attempt to connect general cultural typologies through the survey with social 
preferences and behavior.  
Other experimental studies use choice-based instruments to measure social 
value orientations. Offerman et al. (1996), Sonnemans et al. (1998) and van Dijk et al. 
(2002) use the ring-test developed by Liebrand (1984) to classify subjects as 
individualistic (only concerned about their own payoff), cooperative (concerned about 
the sum of own and other’s payoff), altruistic (only concerned about the other’s 
payoff), competitive (concerned about the difference between own and other’s payoff) 
or aggressive (only concerned in minimizing the earnings of the other). However, the 
ring test provides only altruism scores, while our instrument has an advantage of 
measuring reciprocal attitudes in addition to altruism. In the context of the voluntary 
contribution mechanism for the provision of public goods, Fischbacher et al. (2001) 
and Gachter et al. (2003) classify people into conditional cooperator (reciprocal type) 
and free-rider (self-interested). Using a linear conditional-contribution profile in a 
public good environment, Kurzban and Houzer (2005) classify subjects into free 
riders, cooperators and reciprocal types. These studies use the allocation choices in 
the ring test or actual contributions in the public good game. In contrast, our 
instrument measures preferences using attitudinal questions.  
The contribution of this paper is to provide a methodology to predict social 
preferences using a cultural survey drawn from WVS questions, and to analyze to 
4 what extend these survey measures correlate with economic behavior in the two-
person games laboratory experiment. Whereas previous studies employ choice-based 
instruments, or use attitudinal instruments to measure only certain attitudes (e.g., 
trust), we show that general dimensions of culture that explain altruism and 
reciprocity may be reliably measured by a survey, and used to predict people’s 
economic choices. This study further suggests promising ways integrating tools 
developed in sociology and cultural anthropology into economic research.  
2 Experimental design 
Subject participated in laboratory experimental sessions which had two main parts: 
survey and games. The survey consisted of twenty two questions selected from the 
WVS. Eleven questions were used to measure reciprocity (grid) scores, and eleven 
questions to measure altruism (group) scores. In line with Chai et al. (2009), we 
calculate reciprocity and altruism indexes as weighted averages, measured on zero to 
one scale.  The survey questions and the details on the index construction are given in 
Appendix A.
1 Similar to Liebrand (1984) and Van Dijk et al. (2002), the survey 
preceded games. Immediately after the survey, the subjects participated in five two-
person games: dictator game, non-convex ultimatum game, convex ultimatum game, 
binary trust game and convex trust game, in the listed order.
2 We choose games that 
are the most commonly-studied in experimental literature on social preferences (e.g., 
Camerer 2003) to allow for comparison with other studies.  Each subject was matched 
with a different person in each task. This feature of experimental design reflects the 
one-shot situation to minimize repeated-game motives for other-regarding behavior, 
and thus focus on culture as a determinant of behavior. Both the survey and the 
experimental games were implemented using z-tree software (Fischbacher 2007). 
  Sessions varied depending on whether the subjects made decision in one role 
or in both roles in each game. In the one-role treatment, each subject was placed 
either in the player 1 role or player 2 role for all games. In the two-role treatment, 
each subject was first placed in player 1’s role, and then in a player 2’s role, each time 
matched with a different person. We employed the strategy method in all games so 
                                                 
1 Cronbach alpha coefficient of .7219 for the grid-group scale shows high reliability. Appendix A 
provides detail for the questionnaire and the construction of the grid and group measures.  
5 that both players made choices without the knowledge of the other player’s actual 
decision. In all sessions, we provided no feedback on the results after each task, and 
the subjects were not given any information to identify their matched person in each 
task. No feedback design minimizes ordering and learning effects. To decrease the 
income effect, we used a random payment similar to Charness and Rabin (2002) and 
Chen and Li (2009): at the end of the session, two game decisions made by each 
subject were randomly chosen for the payment. The subject computer screen then 
displayed the subject earnings for each part of the session, and the final random 
payment. The experimental instructions, and a sample screenshot, are provided in the 
Supplementary Materials. 
Next we review the details of each game, and discuss the hypotheses to be 
tested. 
 
2.1 Dictator game 
In the dictator game (e.g., Forsythe et al. 1994), a sender (player 1) is endowed with 
ten dollars and is given an opportunity to split the money between herself and the 
counterpart. For this game, the grid-group theory suggests that people with higher 
altruism measured by the group index will offer more to their counterpart.  The 
corresponding hypothesis is as follows:  
 
H1: Individuals with higher altruism (group) score give more than individuals with 
lower altruism score. 
 
2.2 Ultimatum game 
In the ultimatum game, a proposer (player 1) decides on the division of ten dollars 
between himself/herself and a responder (player 2). In the sequential version of the 
ultimatum game (Guth et al. 1982), responder moves knowing the offer made by 
proposer. We use two simultaneous versions of the ultimatum game: a non-convex  
and a convex ultimatum game. In the non-convex ultimatum game, a proposer 
chooses the split of ten dollars, and a responder submits the lowest acceptable amount 
                                                                                                                                            
2 We did not randomize the order of games, on the grounds that order effects, if present, are unlikely to 
vary across cultural types. Hence a fixed game order does not contradict our research objective of 
studying the effect of culture on behavior in games.  
6 without the knowledge of the offered amount. In the convex version of the game 
(Andreoni et al. 2003), a proposer’s task is to choose the dividing rule, i.e. the 
percentage of the total amount offered to the responder. A responder’s task is to 
specify how many dollars total, between zero and ten dollars, she wants to divide for 
each possible dividing rule. Including both versions of the ultimatum game allows us 
to consider rejection rates as a function of levels of offer, which is helpful in 
examining reciprocity. Standard theory predicts the equilibrium offer of one dollar 
(one percent share of the total in the convex game) by the player 1, and acceptance of 
any offer (designation of all ten dollars to divide) by player 2. We address the 
following questions: Do individuals with a higher altruism score offer more than those 
with low altruism scores? Would individuals with higher reciprocity scores reject 
more offers in the non-convex game, and choose to divide less money in the convex 
game, to enforce social norms? Do individuals with low altruism scores give less in 
the dictator game than in the ultimatum game? Would the amount of giving for 
individuals with higher altruism scores be the same across dictator and ultimatum 
games?  The hypotheses, based on the grid-group cultural theory, are as follows: 
 
H2-A: Individuals with higher altruism (group) scores offer higher amounts than 
individuals with lower altruism scores; 
 
H2-B: Individuals with higher reciprocity (grid) scores reject more (choose less 
money to divide in the convex game) than individuals with lower reciprocity scores.  
 
H2-C: Individuals with low altruism scores give less in the dictator game than in the 
ultimatum game;  
 
H2-D: The amount of giving by individuals with high altruism scores is no different 
between the dictator and the ultimatum games. 
 
Regarding the hypothesis H2-B above, we note that if subjects in our pool share the 
same social norm (e.g., the 50-50 split), then we may expect higher rejection rates by 
reciprocal subjects away from this norm, but not near the norm. If, on the other hand, 
our subjects have heterogeneous norms, then we may expect higher rejection rates by 
reciprocal norm-followers at any offer levels. Grid-group theory allows for norm 
heterogeneity and thus higher rejection rates at all offer levels, rather than at specific 
levels (such as away from the 50-50 split). We will discuss the implications of our 
7 results on norm homo- or heterogeneity when we analyze the experimental results in 
Section 3 below.   
 
2.3 Trust games 
Trust plays important facilitating role in exchange economies that promote growth 
and development (Knack and Keefer 1997). We use the trust game to study how grid-
group cultural attributes affect trusting behavior among individuals. In each version of 
our trust game, a truster (player 1) is given six dollars, while a trustee (player 2) has 
no endowment. In the binary trust game, player 1 either sends all six dollars to player 
2 or keeps it all. In the convex trust game, player 1 may send any integer dollar 
amount between zero to six dollars to player 2, which is then doubled by the 
experimenter. We allow for various levels of dollars sent to better measure the degree 
of trust. In both binary and convex trust games, player 2 is then free to send back to 
player 1 any portion of the doubled money.   Our convex trust game differs from Berg 
et al. (1995) investment game by the fact that we employ the strategy method, so that 
the second player does not know the first player’s action when making a decision. In 
addition, in our setting the sent money is doubled instead of tripled, as it allows for 
better separation across cultural types.
3  
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the trust games is to send nothing, 
while the social optimum requires sending all. We pose the following questions: Do 
we find more trust among individuals with higher altruism scores?  Do individuals 
with higher reciprocity scores enforce social norms and thus return less than those 
with lower reciprocity scores?  The hypotheses based on the grid-group theory are as 
follows:  
 
H3-A: Individuals with higher altruism (group) scores trust more often in the binary 
trust game, and send more in the convex trust game; 
 
H3-B: Individuals with higher reciprocity (grid) scores return less than individuals 
with low reciprocity scores. 
 
                                                 
3 If the sent money is tripled, the Pareto Optimality motive to trust becomes stronger, and we may see 
less variation in behavior across distinct cultural types.  
8 2.4 Procedures 
The subjects were recruited from the student population at the University of Hawaii at 
Manoa during May-July 2009. The sessions ranged in size from ten to twenty 
participants. Each subjects participated in only one session. Each session consisted of 
two main parts. In the first part, the subjects answered the survey questions, which 
took 15-20 minutes. In the second part, the subjects participated in experimental 
games. The sessions lasted about one hour. The subjects were paid, on average, 19 
dollars US, with the minimum of 10, the maximum of 42, and the standard deviation 
of 4.96 dollars.  
3 Results 
The total 220 subjects participated in the experiment conducted over the course of 
fifteen sessions. Nine sessions with the total 120 subjects were conducted using the 
one-role setting, and six sessions with the total of 100 subjects were conducted with 
the two-role setting. As we find no significant role reversal effects
4, below we report 
the results for the pooled data, while controlling for the treatment in our regression 
analysis.  
3.1 Distribution of cultural types 
In the sample of 220 subjects, the average altruism (group) score was .41 with the 
minimum at .045, maximum at .83 and standard deviation of .17. The average 
reciprocity (grid) score was .5 with the minimum score at .15, maximum at .85 and 
deviation of .12. The survey instrument allows us to distinguish between three cultural 
types: altruists (low in reciprocity and high in altruism dimensions), self-interested 
type (low in both dimensions) and reciprocal (high in reciprocity dimension but either 
low or high in the altruism dimension). Given that reciprocity and altruism scores 
range between zero and one, we define a reciprocity or altruism score to be high if the 
score is above (.5) and low if the score is at or below (.5). These cut points for 
defining types are in accordance with grid-group theory; see Chai et al. (2009). The 
results of this classification are listed at the bottom of Table 1. We classify 35.5 
percent of our subjects as altruists, 34 percent as self-interested, and 30.5 percent as 
                                                 
4 See Dorj et al. (2011) for a detailed comparison of the one-role and two-role treatment results. 
9 reciprocal (15 percent with high-reciprocity and low-altruism, and 15.5 percent with 
high-reciprocity and high-altruism).  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE. 
 
Let us compare our classification results with other studies.  A closely related notion 
used in previous studies for altruist is an unconditional cooperator, for self-interested 
type is a free rider (Kurzban and Houzer 2005), and for reciprocal type is a 
conditional cooperator (Fischbacher et al. 2001). Kurzban and Houzer (2005) find the 
following distribution of types using a linear public good environment: 20 percent 
free riders, 13 percent cooperators and 63 percent the reciprocal type. Fischbacher et. 
al. (2001) and Gachter et al. (2003) employ one-shot unconditional and conditional 
contributions in the public good setting and find the following distribution of types: 
33 percent of free riders, 50 percent of conditional cooperators. Van Dijk et al. (2002) 
use the ring test and find that about half of the subjects concerned about other’s 
interest. The majority of their subjects (38-48 percent) show positive orientations, i.e. 
they are willing to sacrifice own resources to the benefit of other. Less than 24 percent 
of subjects express a negative orientation towards others evidenced by their negative 
marginal rates of substitution between others’ payoff and own payoff.  
Qualitatively, the distribution of types that we obtain is consistent with the 
above findings. Interestingly, the percent of reciprocal type found in our study is 
smaller than the percent of conditional cooperators found in other studies. This 
difference is likely due to the differences in instruments employed.  Most importantly, 
we find that our classification into cultural types has a strong predictive power for the 
behavior in economic games, as we discuss next.  
3.2 Behavior in two-person games 
The features of our experimental design (re-matching of subjects for each decision, 
employment of  the strategy method, and no feedback following the decisions) allows 
us to treat each decision as an independent observation. In what follows, we use non-
parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) tests and parametric Tobit regressions 
to study if behavior differs across cultural types.  Descriptive statistics for each game 
overall, and by cultural type, are reported in Table 1 above. The table also reports the 
results WMW two-tailed tests for differences of decisions between types. The Tobit 
10 regressions model behavior in each game as a function of reciprocity (grid) and 
altruism (group) scores, controlling for personal characteristics such as gender, 
education, age, citizenship, religion.
5 A session dummy and treatment dummy (equal 
to zero if one-role and one if two-role treatment) variables are included to control for 
variation across fifteen sessions of two treatments. The results of these regressions are 
displayed in Table 2 and Table 3.  
TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE 
The variable gender equals 0(1) for fe(males). Education is equal to 1, 2, …, 7 for 
freshman, sophomore, junior, senior, M.A., PhD students, staff correspondingly. Age 
specifies the age of a participant. The citizenship dummy equals to 1 if a person is a 
U.S. citizen and zero otherwise. No religion variable equals to 1 if the person has no 
religion and zero otherwise.  
We start the analysis with the dictator game. 
3.2.1 Dictator game 
Previous experiments show that donations in the dictator game vary dramatically from 
zero in double blind designs (Hoffman et al. 1994) to half of the endowment in 
designs where the recipient gives a brief description about herself or himself to the 
proposer (Bohnet and Frey 1999). In line with many previous studies, average 
donations in our sessions were above zero, but below fifty percent of the endowment. 
In the divide ten dollars dictator game, the mean donation for all sessions was 35.5 
percent, as reported in Table 1, column 1. Modal offers were fifty percent of the 
endowment. Overall 28 percent of subjects offered half of their endowment, 44 
percent of subjects offered from 1 to 4 dollars, and 16 percent of population sent zero 
money. Since in the dictator game there is no strategic concern to offer and the fear of 
rejection removed, altruism, moral norms or social norms explain giving. We find that 
                                                 
5 The participants’ demographic characteristics were collected several days prior to experimental 
sessions through an on-line survey administered through the SurveyMonkey tool. Along with basic 
demographic questions, the survey included questions to measure several alternative dimensions of 
participant personality. The results of the online survey are discussed in a separate study; see Chai et al. 
(2010). We believe that participation in this survey did not have an effect on the subject behaviour in 
our laboratory sessions, as the online survey and the lab session were separated by a significant time 
interval, and were administered in two very different environments.  
11 subject behavior varies by their cultural values, measured by the grid-group scores 
which relate to reciprocity and altruism.  
Result 1: In the dictator game, altruists (low in grid and high in group dimensions) 
donate more than reciprocal types (high in a grid dimension) and self-interested (low 
in both dimensions) type. 
Support: Table 1 row 1, and Figure 1. As predicted by hypothesis H1, group scores 
that are accountable for the altruism are positively correlated with donations. 
Considering offers across cultural types, altruists offer significantly more than 
reciprocal type (p=.026) and self-interested type (p=.019). See Figure 1 and Table 1, 
row 1. In the regression, this result was not strong enough to be significant (p=.15).  
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Based on WMW test, we conclude that hypothesis H1 is confirmed. We next consider 
the ultimatum games. 
3.2.2 Non-convex ultimatum game: 
Mean offers increase to 45 percent of ten dollars as compared to 35.5 percent in the 
dictator game. Consistent with previous findings, percent of population offering half 
of their endowment rose from 28 in the dictator game to 38, and percent of subjects 
offering from 1 to 4 dollars fell from 44 percent in the dictator game to 39, and only 3 
percent of population offered zero money to their match as compared with the 16 
percent in the dictator game. In the ultimatum game, cultural values such as altruism 
and reciprocity both played significant roles.   
Result 2: Offers in the non-convex ultimatum game were higher for individuals with 
higher altruism (group) scores. Individuals with higher altruism (group) scores 
accepted lower offers while the minimal acceptable amount was higher for 
individuals with higher reciprocity (grid) scores.   
Support: Tables 1 and 2, Figure 1. As Table 1 indicates, altruists offer 49.5 percent, as 
compared to 43.3 percent offered by self-interested people, and 42.7 percent offered 
by reciprocators. The difference between the altruists and self-interested people is 
marginally significant (p-value is 0.096). The regression results in Table 2 show that 
both reciprocity (grid) and altruism (group) attributes explain variations in behavior. 
12 The altruism score significantly and positively affects offers (p=.064). Moreover, 
those with a higher altruism score have a lower acceptable amount than those with a 
lower altruism score (p=.012). Consistent with the hypothesis in H2-B, those with a 
higher reciprocity (grid) score have a higher minimum acceptable amount (p=.054).  
Regarding hypotheses in 2C-2D, we find that donations in the dictator game 
were smaller than offers in the ultimatum game across all three cultural types 
(p<.001). However, the differences in donations in the dictator game and offers in the 
ultimatum game become insignificant for altruism scores below 0.3 or above 0.7 
(p=.1447 and p=.1020).   
In sum, the hypothesis H2-A, the positive impact of altruism score on offers is 
supported by the results in the ultimatum game. Hypotheses H2-B on the higher 
rejection rates by reciprocators is also supported.  While the hypothesis H2-C 
(individuals with low altruism scores give less in the dictator game than in the 
ultimatum game) is confirmed, the hypothesis H2-D (individuals with high altruism 
scores offer the same amounts in the dictator and the ultimatum games) is only 
marginally supported for individuals with altruism scores above 0.7.  
We next consider the behavior in the convex ultimatum game. 
3.2.3 Convex ultimatum game: 
In the convex ultimatum game as in Andreoni et al. (2003), a proposer (player 1) 
offers a percentage of the total pie to the player 2 who in turn decides on the amount 
of dollars to be divided for each possible dividing rule.   The maximum money to 
divide was ten dollars. The average offer was 37 percent of the total pie. About one 
third of subjects (34 percent) offered  equal split, which was also the modal choice.  
48 percent of total offers were between ten to forty percentages of the pie. Only 12 
percent of offers were at the subgame perfect equilibrium of (99, 1), and 37 percent of 
them were rejected. The total rejection rate was 9 percent in which proposers’ offers 
vary from 1 to 30 percent of the pie. We find significant effects of cultural 
characteristics on behavior.  
Result 3: In the convex ultimatum game, altruists offer higher shares than the self-
interested type. Individuals with higher reciprocity (grid) score divide fewer dollars 
than low-reciprocity individuals.  
13 Support: Tables 1, Figures 1 and 2. As hypothesized in H2-A, altruists offer higher 
shares than the self-interested type (39.3 vs. 33.5 percent respectively with p=.032). 
See Table 1and Figure 1. For player 2 decisions, more than half of the subjects (61 
percent) in player 2 role choose to divide the maximal amount of ten dollars. 
Consistent with the hypothesis H2-B, regression results show a negative and 
significant effect of reciprocity (grid) score on the responder’s decision on how much 
to be divided (p=.009 in Table 2). Therefore, those with higher reciprocity scores 
divide fewer dollars than those with lower reciprocity scores. Moreover, this result is 
significant for each dividing rule when player 1 offered more than ten percent to 
player 2; see Table 4 in Appendix B. This indicates that high-reciprocal subjects were 
willing to bear a cost of punishing others by dividing fewer dollars for the level of 
offer above 10 percent. This suggests heterogeneity of perceived social norms among 
reciprocal subjects. For some reciprocal types their perceived social norm may be 
below the 50:50 split, and they may reject offers above fifty percent. 
The non-parametric test shows that strong reciprocators divide fewer dollars 
than altruists (p=.054)
6 and self-interested individuals (p=.02). See Table 1, Figure 2.  
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Interestingly, conditional on the dividing rule we find distinct behavior across types. 
For example, for dividing rules at 60 percent (p<.05 in Table 1) and above (p<.01) 
reciprocators divide fewer dollars than altruists. This implies that reciprocal subjects 
punish others for misbehavior (i.e. offering more than 50 percent of a pie) by dividing 
less money for shares above 50:50 split. This suggests that for reciprocal type social 
norm may be different depending on their beliefs. Similar story can be seen 
comparing self-interested subjects with reciprocal ones. We find no differences in 
behavior between these types for the shares in the 1-40 percent range. Again, for 
offers of 50-60 percent of the pie (p<.05) and 70-99 percent (p<.01) reciprocators 
divide fewer dollars than self-interested types. Note that dividing fewer dollars means 
that both players’ earnings are reduced. 
In sum, the hypotheses H2-A, H2-B are verified for the convex ultimatum 
game. Higher rejection rates and fewer dollars to divide observed for reciprocal 
                                                 
6 The significance level increases to p=.031 for the rules above 1 percent of share. 
14 subjects for almost all dividing rules suggest the norm heterogeneity among our 
subject population.  
We analyze the results of the binary trust game next. 
 
3.2.4 Binary trust game: 
In the binary version of trust game, overall 55.2 percent of subjects in the role of 
player 1 trusted others and sent six dollars which was doubled by experimenter. In 
this game a trustee (player 2) may return all or some portion of money back to a 
truster (player 1). Among subjects in the role of player 2 (trustee), 17.5 percent acted 
in a self-interested manner and returned zero to the trusting person. The modal return 
of six dollars involved responses from 46 percent of the subjects. On average subjects 
sent 55.2 percent and returned 75 percent of six dollars (37.4 percent of 12 dollars)
7.  
Result 4: In the binary trust game, altruists trust more and return more than 
individuals with low altruism. Reciprocal types return fewer dollars than altruists. 
Support: Tables 1 and 3, Figures 3 and 4. In line with the hypothesis H3-A, there were 
more trusting altruists (61.8 percent) than trusting self-interested (44.7 percent) 
individuals (p=.085); see Table 1 and Figure 3. Regression result in Table 3 shows 
that altruism (group) score positively correlates with a return from the doubled money 
(p=.031). This suggests that altruists may be trustful and trustworthy. In line with the 
hypothesis in H3-B, reciprocators returned fewer dollars than altruists (p=.011). See 
Table 1, Figure 4.  
FIGURES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE 
In sum, hypotheses H3-A and H3-B are verified for the binary trust game. 
Next, we report results of the convex trust game.  
 
3.2.5 Convex trust game: 
In the convex version of the trust game, player 1 (truster) has an option to send all or 
any portion of six dollars. The amount trusted was doubled, and player 2 (trustee) may 
send back any portion of the doubled money back to player 1. The data show that 36 
percent of subjects kept all money for themselves. In this game, only 20 percent of 
15 subjects trusted all six dollars in comparison with 55.2 percent in the binary trust 
game. The mean amount trusted was 44.6 percent of the six dollars endowment. 
Further, 58 percent of responders kept all money and did not reciprocate trusting 
behavior while 8 percent returned back half of the doubled money. The rest of data 
lies in the range between 1 and 5 dollars.   
Result 5: In the convex trust game, altruism (group) scores were positively correlated 
with the amount returned. Reciprocity (grid) scores were negatively correlated with 
amounts returned to trusters. Reciprocators returned fewer dollars than altruists. 
Support:  Tables 1, 3 and Figure 4. While the differences across types in trusting 
behavior are not significant (Table 1), we still note that, in line with the hypothesis 
H3-A, there were more altruists than other types among trusting individuals. Among 
those trusting any positive amount, altruists trust on average 47.9 percent as compared 
to 43.6 percent by self-interested individuals and 44.7 percent by reciprocators. From 
Table 3, the effect of group score on trusting behavior just misses the significance 
level of ten percent (p=0.104). Regarding player 2 (trustee), regression results in 
Table 3 show that subjects with higher reciprocity (grid) scores returned less money 
than those with lower reciprocity scores (p=.019). Behavior across types (Table 1, 
Figure 4) also shows that reciprocal people returned less than altruists (p=.045). This 
again shows that reciprocal types exhibit strong reciprocity and are willing to punish 
others for misbehavior.  
We now consider trustee responses conditional on the level of trust. From 
Table 1, for any amounts above two dollars sent by player 1, altruists returned more 
than the reciprocal types (p<.1 if three dollars were sent, and p<0.05 for higher 
amount).  See Figure 4 for the responders’ decisions across cultural types. Results of 
the Tobit regressions of amount returned conditional on the amount trusted, presented 
in Table 5 in Appendix B,  also show that for any level of trust above one dollar, the 
altruism (group) scores were positively correlated with the amounts returned (p<.05). 
Hence, altruists reward those sending more than two dollars by returning more, and 
show more trustworthiness.  
   In sum, in the convex trust game, we find only weak support for hypothesis 
H3-A, that altruists trust more than other types. However, altruists reward those 
                                                                                                                                            
7 In comparison, Orma herders in Kenya sent 40 percent and repaid 55 percent (Camerer 2003). 
16 sending higher amounts by returning more, thus showing more trustworthiness.   
Hypothesis H3-B is verified: reciprocators return less than altruists. Combining the 
evidence from both binary and convex trust games, we conclude that hypotheses H3-
A and H3-B are both supported by the data.  
 
3.3 Effect of demographics: age, citizenship and religion 
Demographics are often found to have a significant effect on behavior (e.g., Camerer 
2003).  Before turning to the conclusions, we briefly discuss the effects of 
demographics on subject decisions in our experiment.  
 
Result 6: Older people, U.S. citizens and religious individuals donate more in the 
dictator game, offer more in the convex ultimatum game, and trust more in both trust 
games.  
Regression results in Table 2 and Table 3 show that age and US citizen variables 
positively affected giving actions in the dictator game (p<.01). Religion is positively 
correlated with donations as well at 5 percent significance level. These three variables 
positively affected offers in both ultimatum games and significantly so in the convex 
version of the game (p<.05). At the same time, in the non-convex ultimatum game US 
citizens accepted lower offers (p=.038). Older subjects and those with U.S. citizenship 
trusted more in both trust games than younger cohort and non-U.S. citizens (p<.01). 
Religion positively affected trusting action and significantly so in the non-convex 
trust game (p<.05). 
Our findings on demographics are broadly consistent with existing studies. Camerer 
(2003) notes that with age, self-interest is replaced with compromise and fair-
mindedness. The result that the U.S. citizens trust more is similar to findings from 
cross-societal experiments by Yamagishi et al. (1998). They report that U.S. citizens 
have a higher level of general trust than Japanese. Interestingly, we find no significant 
differences in behavior by gender.  
4 Conclusion 
We explain behavior in the dictator, ultimatum and trust games based on two cultural 
dimensions adopted from social and cultural anthropology: grid, which translates into 
17 reciprocity, and group, which translates into altruism. Altruism and reciprocity 
characteristics are measured for each individual using selected items from the WVS. 
We find that altruism and reciprocity attributes systematically affect behavior. In 
particular, the amounts of giving in the ultimatum game were higher for individuals 
with higher altruism score. As predicted, individuals with higher altruism scores 
accepted lower offers while individuals with higher reciprocity scores accepted a 
higher amount. The norm-enforcement behavior, such as dividing fewer dollars the 
convex ultimatum game, was more prevalent among those with a higher reciprocity 
scores than among those with lower reciprocity scores. Individuals with higher 
altruism score were trustworthy. Individuals with higher reciprocity scores returned 
less from the trusted money.  
These conclusions are confirmed if we classify individuals into altruists, 
reciprocal and self-interested cultural types. We find that altruists donate more in the 
dictator game, offer higher shares of a pie in both ultimatum games and trust more 
than self-interested individuals. As predicted, reciprocal types divide fewer dollars 
than other types in the convex ultimatum game. In both versions of the trust game, 
reciprocal types return fewer dollars than altruists because they are willing to punish 
others.  
This research has both practical and methodological implications. Practically, 
a variety of exchanges in our life involve interpersonal relations where one side 
decides on the amount of giving or trusting, and the other side may reciprocate those 
decisions. Further, two-person relations serve as a basis of more complex group 
relations within a team, company, organization or country. The results obtained here 
may be used for the improvement of social exchange within a group. 
Methodologically, our work provides a tool for investigating the pro-social behavior 
using general cultural dimensions that were developed in branches of social sciences 
outside economics. The survey tool suggested here allows to predict and explain 
behavior in a variety of economically-relevant games. 
 
 
18 Appendix A :  GRID/GROUP SURVEY QUESTIONS 
 
Please say, for each of the following, how important it is in your life.  Would you say... 
 
  Very  Rather        Not Very  Not at all 
      Important  Important Important  Important   
 
1. Family  1    2    3       4     
 
2. Friends  1    2    3       4     
 
3. Religion  1    2    3       4     
 
4. With which of these two statements do you tend to agree?  
 
1. Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one's parents are, one must always love and 
respect them  
2. One does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it by their 
behavior and attitudes  
 
5. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in 
dealing with people?  
1. Most people can be trusted  
2. Can't be too careful (have to be very careful) 
 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 
                      Agree   Neither   Disagree         
6. When jobs are scarce, older people                        1          2          3 
should be forced to retire from work early       
 
7. When jobs are scarce, men should have          
more right to a job than women                                  1          2          3 
 
8. Imagine two secretaries, of the same age, doing practically the same job. One finds out that the other 
earns considerably more than she does.  The better paid secretary, however, is quicker, more efficient 
and more reliable at her job.  In your opinion, is it fair or not fair that one secretary is paid more than 
the other? 
1.   Fair 
2.  Not fair 
 
9. There is a lot of discussion about how business and industry should be managed.  Which of these 
four statements comes closest to your opinion?  
1. The owners should run their business or appoint the managers 
2. The owners and the employees should participate in the selection of managers 
3. The government should be the owner and appoint the managers 
4. The employees should own the business and should elect the managers 
 
10. People have different ideas about following instructions at work. Some say that one should follow 
one's superior's instructions even when one does not fully agree with them.  Others say that one should 
follow one's superior's instructions only when one is convinced that they are right. With which of 
these two opinions do you agree? 
1.  Should follow instructions 
2.  Depends 
3.  Must be convinced first  
 
11. Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled or is this not necessary? 
 1.  Needs  children 
2. Not necessary 
19  
 
The following items contain a list of various changes in our way of life that might take place in the near 
future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen, whether you think it would be a good thing, a 
bad thing, or don't you mind?  
 
      Don't 
Good mind  Bad  
12. Less emphasis on money and 
material  possessions    1  2  3 
 
13. Less importance placed 
on work in our lives      1  2  3 
 
14. More emphasis on the 
development of technology    1  2  3 
 
 
15. Greater respect for authority    1  2  3 
 
For the following questions, please place your views along the accompanying scale.  1 means you 
agree completely with the first statement; 10 means you agree completely with the second statement; 
and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.  
 
16.  1. Private ownership of business and industry should be increased  
10. Government ownership of business and industry should be increased 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
17.  1. The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for  
10. People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
18. How important is God in your life?  Please use this scale to indicate - 10 means very important and 
1 means not at all important. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
N o t   a t   a l l          V e r y  
 
Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never 
be justified, or something in between, using this card.  
 
Never                               Always 
Justifiable                                                      Justifiable 
19. Homosexuality     1  /  2   /  3   /  4   /  5   /  6   /  7   /  8   /  9   /  10  
 
20. Prostitution       1  /  2   /  3   /  4   /  5   /  6   /  7   /  8   /  9   /  10  
 
21. Abortion       1  /  2   /  3   /  4   /  5   /  6   /  7   /  8   /  9   /  10  
 
22. Divorce       1  /  2   /  3   /  4   /  5   /  6   /  7   /  8   /  9   /  10  
 
 
Constructing grid/group measures: 
 
We compute grid/group indexes as weighted averages of the above questions, using the following 
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25 90 84.4 29.9 90.5 88.4 73.7 .751 .001
Table 1. Behavior by Cultural Types 
Overall Mean by types,% p-values*, Ho: 
Decision
mean, std.
Altruist Self- Reci- A=S A=R S=R
interested procal 
% dev. (A) (S) ( R)
Dictator game:
Donation,  35.5 25.7 41.7 33.3 30 .019 .026 .758
out of $10
Non-convex ultimatum game:
Offer, out of $10 45.4 22 49.5 43.3 42.7 .096 .187 .938
Minimum 
23.8 19.4 23 22.4 26 .972 .566 .681 acceptable
amount, out of $10
Convex ultimatum game:
Percent of  36.5 21.8 39.3 33.5 36.3 .032 .149 .446
share, 1-99%
Amount divided, 77.3 34.3 78.9 82.2 70.8 .717 .054 .020
out of $10
Offer by player 1, % Percent of ten dollars divided by player 2
1 53.1 45.8 53.9 49.8 55.6 .725 .896 .722
10 61.6 42.6 65.3 58.8 60.2 .379 .220 .848
20 64.7 39.8 65.4 62.9 65.6 .635 .610 .953
30 70.6 35.1 75.4 66.3 69.6 .307 .214 .956
40 78.1 29.3 81.4 78.6 74.0 .877 .079 .186
50 88.6 20.6 90.0 91.6 84.0 .686 .082 .038
60 86.1 22.9 87.9 90.0 80.4 .987 .028 .023
70 85.3 26.2 89.5 89.0 77.1 .802 .008 .007
80 84.6 28.2 89.3 88.8 75.2 .899 .004 .004
90 84.4 29.9 90.5 88.4 73.7 .751 .001 .006 .006
99 83.4 32.9 91.2 88.8 69.4 .750 .001 .004
Binary trust game:
Percent trusted $6 55.2 61.8 44.7 58.5 .085 .746 .197
Percent returned, 37.4 22.9 42.2 36.4 33.2 .143 .011 .399
out of $12
Convex trust game:
Percent trusted, 45.6 47.9 43.6 44.7 .615 .627 .931
out of $6
Percent returned,  13.1 18.1 17.8 12.5 8.3 .209 .045 .463
out of sent
Sent by player 1, $ Percent returned from original sent 0-6 dollars by player 2
1 42.0 58.6 45.1 39.1 41.3 .405 .538 .840
2 47.2 53.0 52.0 48.9 40.2 .712 .304 .570
3 54.5 45.2 62.1 53.6 47.1 .281 .077 .535
4 58.9 43.1 66.2 60.9 48.9 .482 .024 .245
5 62.8 44.3 72.2 62.6 52.6 .201 .016 .352
6 70.9 47.1 85.6 69.9 55.4 .122 .002 .168
Frequency, % 35.5 34 30.5
*p-value of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, two-tailed;Table 2. Tobit regression, dictator and ultimatum games
Dictator game Non-convex ultimatum game Convex ultimatum game
Independent
Donation,  Offer,  Minimum  Percent  Amount
$0-10 $0-10 acceptable  of share, divided,
amount, $0-10 1-99% $0-10
variables: Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t
group score 3.53 .150 3.68* .064 -3.93** .012 -2.46 .898 7.33 .425
grid score 1.58 .434 0.37 .822 2.48* .054 16.82 .290 -20.9*** .009
session 0.08 .280 0 .971 0.02 .570 0.08 .892 -0.12 .632
gender -0.29 .615 -0.12 .790 -0.12 .760 -4.39 .338 2.22 .329
education -0.11 .689 -0.2 .341 0.01 .931 -0.24 .909 -0.48 .618
age 0.11*** .008 0.06* .076 0.04 .197 0.74** .019 -0.08 .600
US citizen 1.41** .043 0.67 .225 -0.95** .038 10.28* .061 2.96 .263
no religion -1.22* .085 -0.74 .191 -0.45 .341 -11.2** .045 2.18 .436
treatment -0.5 .403 -0.06 .896 -0.79* .052 0.27 .954 -0.13 .956
constant -1.58 .534 2.17 .289 3.23 .040 15.2 .448 18.7 .044
adj.R
2 .0342 .0221 .0421 .0122 .0406
N 112 112 109 112 109
*, **, *** significance level at 10, 5, 1 percentTable 3. Tobit regression, trust games 
Binary trust game Convex trust game
Independent
Amount trusted, Amount returned,  Amount trusted, Amount returned, 
 0 or $6 $0-12  $0-6 $0-12
variables: Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t
group score 8.03 .180 5.85** .031 7.64 .103 3.78 .335
grid score 4.04 .363 0.33 .878 1.98 .552 -7.53** .019
session 0.18 .282 0.1 .185 0.22 .101 0.18 .113
gender -1.45 .236 -0.47 .453 -0.21 .827 0.65 .485
education -0.15 .805 -0.18 .505 -0.03 .947 -0.36 .379
age 0.5*** .004 0.03 .550 0.29*** .004 0 .976
US citizen 6.28*** .001 0.19 .799 4.14*** .002 -0.79 .478
no religion -3.12** .048 0.27 .729 -1.48 .208 2.2* .062
treatment 3.72*** .007 0.78 .239 1.38 .173 1.29 .200
constant -16.8 .007 -0.17 .948 -13.8 .005 -1.03 .785
adj.R
2 .0855 .0215 .0719 .0373
N 104 101 104 101
*, **, *** significance level at 10, 5, 1 percent  d
  d
%
990 6 1 921 807
Table 4. Tobit regression, convex ultimatum game (amount of dollars divided by player 2)
if 1%  if 10% if  20% if 30% if 40 if 50%
Independent amount divided amount divide   amount divided  amount divided  amount divided  amount divided 
variables: Coef. P>t Coef. t P> Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t
group score 13.7 .262 9.4 .303 4.1 .600 3.1 .595 0.7 .898 -0.9 .883
grid score -12.7 .199 -12.0 .112 -13.3** .044 -11.7** .020 -11.8*** .007 -14.5*** .009
session -0.3 .395 -0.2 .337 -0.1 .589 -0.1 .611 -0.1 .719 -0.1 .734
gender 3.1 .302 1.4 .521 0.1 .945 0.4 .795 0.1 .926 -1.0 .502
education 0.6 .623 0.5 .607 0.3 .677 0.3 .614 0.1 .873 -0.3 .683
age 0.2 .325 0.0 .805 -0.1 .600 -0.1 .441 -0.1 .305 -0.1 .164
US citizen 7.4** .045 4.4 .106 3.3 .148 2.4 .176 0.9 .553 0.7 .702
no religion 6.2 .104 2.9 .298 3.6 .143 1.6 .371 0.9 .565 -0.8 .674
treatment 1.8 .558 0.6 .808 0.6 .770 0.5 .735 -0.2 .908 -2.8 .110
constant -11.3 .36 5.5 .543 9.8 .204 11.7 .050 16.5 .002 28.0 0
adj.R
2 .0326 .0203 .0199 .0241 .0296 .0803
N 109 109 109 109 109 109
*, **, *** significance level at 10, 5, 1 percent
Table 4 (continues). Tobit regression, convex ultimatum game (amount of dollars divided by player 2)
if 60%  if 70% if  80% if 90% if 99%
Independent amount divided amount divide   amount divided  amount divided  amount divided 
variables: Coef. P>t Coef. t P> Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t
group score group score 01 -0.1 990 . 16 -1. 793 . 14 793 - 859 .4 .859 -09 0.9 .921 36 807 3.6 .
grid score -15.7*** .001 -17.7*** .002 -21.6*** .002 -24.6*** .003 -36.2** .011
session 0.1 .526 0.1 .613 0.0 .909 -0.2 .399 -0.1 .747
gender 0.7 .573 0.9 .551 2.6 .175 3.3 .151 3.1 .396
education 0.3 .636 0.3 .626 0.7 .406 0.4 .660 0.3 .820
age 0.0 .705 0.0 .754 -0.1 .598 -0.1 .330 -0.2 .393
US citizen 0.6 .711 0.3 .862 0.4 .851 1.5 .564 2.0 .643
no religion 0.6 .721 0.1 .946 -0.6 .816 -1.5 .597 -3.7 .431
treatment -1.2 .404 -1.1 .501 -1.5 .449 0.2 .950 -4.1 .303
constant 17.3 .001 19.7 .002 23.0 .004 29.3 .003 41.9 .012
adj.R
2 .0629 .0616 .077 .0872 .0937
N 109 109 109 109 109
*, **, *** significance level at 10, 5, 1 percentd e
$5 if $6
Table 5. Tobit regression, convex trust game (amount returned by player 2)
if $1 if $2 if $3 if $4 if 
Independent amount returne amount return d amount returned amount returned amount returned amount returned
variables: Coef. P>t Coef. t P> Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t
group score 2.2 .127 4.3 .011 3.7 .006 3.5 .031 4.6 .027 6.9 .009
grid score 0.8 .488 0.8 .526 0.5 .662 -1.3 .306 -2.0 .209 -2.5 .210
session 0.0 .948 0.0 .893 0.1 .156 0.0 .369 0.0 .497 0.0 .596
gender 0.4 .273 0.2 .541 0.1 .734 0.1 .755 -0.1 .909 0.1 .930
education -0.1 .550 -0.1 .607 0.1 .667 0.1 .448 0.1 .618 0.1 .710
age 0.0 .138 0.0 .692 0.0 .685 0.0 .998 0.0 .817 0.0 .993
US citizen -0.3 .407 -0.2 .695 -0.2 .565 -0.2 .634 -0.1 .840 0.1 .933
no religion -0.2 .609 -0.1 .893 0.5 .226 1.0 .037 1.4 .025 1.5 .052
treatment 0.1 .725 0.6 .164 0.6 .061 0.7 .066 1.0 .059 0.6 .329
constant -2.3 .117 -2.3 .159 -2.0 .126 -0.7 .637 -0.1 .957 -0.3 .900
adj.R
2 .0405 .0365 .0498 .0339 .0339 .0288
N 101 101 101 101 101 101































Figure 1. Dictator and Ultimatum games: 
Percent offered by player 1, by Typology 
donation in dictator game
offer in non-convex ultimatum game












































Figure 2. Convex Ultimatum game: Amount divided by player 
2, by Typology 



























































Figure 4. Trust game: Percentage returned by player 2, 
by Typology 
Binary Convex;    p-values for Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, two-sided
p=.011
p=.045